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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between 
symmetric regions. We show that given the opposite strategic nature of tax (strategic 
complement) and public investment (strategic substitute), there is possibility of multiple 
equilibria. We find that if strategic substitute effect dominates strategic complement effect, then 
both regions have first mover advantage in a timing game and simultaneous move Nash 
equilibrium (early, early) emerges; otherwise sequential move equilibria-(early, late) and (late, 
early) emerges. Also, sequential move Nash equilibria are Pareto improving than simultaneous 
move outcome. Lastly, race-to-the-bottom in taxes is restricted in sequential move equilibria.   
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Joint strategic complements 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the fiscal competition for mobile capital, governments compete to attract capital flows using 
tax (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1988) as well as non-tax 
instruments
2
 (Hindriks, Peralta and Weber, 2008; Dembour and Wauthy, 2009; Pieretti and 
Zanaj, 2011). There is plenty of empirical evidence for use of tax and non-tax instruments to 
attract mobile capital across countries and regions within a country. Hauptmeier et al. (2012), 
analyze the strategic nature of tax and public input competition, using the data from Germany 
municipal regions. They find that tax rate in a region is inversely affected by public input 
provision in the other region. To counter the tax rate decrease in a region, other region can 
decrease the tax rate or can increase its provision for public input good. Benassy-Quere et al. 
(2007), in the context of European countries, provide empirical support for the joint role of taxes 
and public input goods in attracting foreign direct investment. They document that the role of 
productivity enhancing public goods is as large as the role of taxes in determining capital flows. 
Further, countries, which set high tax rates, can attract capital by providing higher level of public 
good. Bellak et al. (2009) corroborates the findings of Benassy-Quere et al. (2007), that taxes 
and infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity, transport and production facilities) are 
determinants of FDI in central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). They also show that tax 
elasticities are decreasing function of infrastructure facilities. This means that for higher 
infrastructure levels, regions can charge higher taxes and vice-versa. Venkatesan and Verma 
(2000), in the context of Indian federal system, demonstrates that there is evidence of industrial 
policy based competition among Indian states, using industrial policy and FDI data from 1991-
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 One of the widely used instruments apart from taxation is public investment in terms of infrastructure, electricity, 
law and order conditions, ease of doing business and so forth. These goods are considered to be productivity 
enhancing and therefore making the region attractive for capital inflows. 
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97. They document that there is wide variation in tax rates as well as in non-tax incentives
3
 
provided by state governments, which determine the capital flows to these states and there is 
positive correlation between the incentives provided by the governments and inflow of capital. It 
is evident from these empirical studies that both tax rates and public investments provided by the 
governments are important factors in determining allocation of mobile capital across regions.  
On the other hand, the theoretical literature on tax and non-tax instruments in regional 
competition for mobile capital is relatively new and sparse. One of the key issues in this 
literature remains to understand the interaction and interdependence of tax and non-tax 
instruments and their implication on capital allocation, race-to-the-bottom in tax rates, provision 
of productivity enhancing public goods and social welfare across regions. A handful of studies 
have attempted to answer these questions in different settings. Hindriks, Peralta and Weber 
(2008) analyze the interaction between capital taxation and public investment provision in a 
sequential choice setting where first public investment choice is made followed by capital 
taxation. They show that tax competition distorts public investment level and reduces the level of 
public good provision. In a Hotelling type model of sequential choice of tax and public 
investment competition, Dembour and Wauthy (2009), find that nature of regional spillover 
affects the optimal public investment level as well as tax intensity. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) in 
an asymmetric regions setting show that, small jurisdictions can compete with larger regions by 
providing higher level of public input without engaging in tax undercutting. One of the key 
aspects of these studies is that tax and non-tax (instruments) choices are made in different stages 
of the competition between the regions. This has led to understanding of only the indirect effect 
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 They characterizing these incentives in three groups: a) financial incentives (investment subsidy; financing of 
technology, land etc; special packages for large projects), b) fiscal incentives (export based incentives, sales tax 
incentives, stamp and registration duty subsidy, free electricity etc.) and c) other incentives (single window 
clearance, road and transport facilities etc.). 
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of tax and non-tax instruments on each other without direct interaction in level of tax rates and 
public investment choices. One argument put forward for the same remains that public 
investment decision being irreversible in nature is taken at first stage followed by tax choice by 
the regions. But this may not be the case always.  
Regions can choose their tax and public investment policies in yearly budgets and can be 
simultaneously determined. This plausible case in a real world situation remains interesting from 
multiple perspectives. First, this suggests that tax and non-tax instruments can strategically 
interact when chosen simultaneously and can affect the optimal levels of each other. To elaborate 
further, tax competition is strategic complement in nature (à la Bertrand) and public investment 
competition is considered strategic substitute in nature (à la Cournot) (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 
2010a; Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010b). A simultaneous choice of them would lead to opposite 
effect on social welfares of the regions. In other words, we can see a spectrum of outcomes 
ranging from one effect dominating the other and vice-versa. Second, this setting would do away 
with the balanced budget conditions for regions. Thus suggesting that there can be possibility of 
both surplus as well as deficit for the regions while setting both tax and non-tax instruments 
simultaneously. This is also closer to real world setting.  
Given the above discussion, this paper analyzes the nature and consequences of interregional 
fiscal competition for mobile capital in terms of simultaneous choice of tax rate and level of 
public investment by the regions. Further, to contribute to the growing literature on endogenous 
choice of fiscal instruments and strategic timings of regions (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010a; 
Ogawa, 2013; Hindriks and Nishimura, 2015), we also endogenize the timings moves by regions 
in tax and public investment competition.  
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One study that closely relates to ours is Kawachi et al. (2015), where sequential versus 
simultaneous choice of tax and non-tax instruments is considered, one at a time and then 
sequentially. A key difference in their framework is that they consider timing of regions while 
considering either just one instrument (tax or public investment) or when both instruments are 
considered public investment choice is still before tax and not jointly. In our setting, we are 
interested in the joint simultaneous choice of tax and public investment level by a region; and 
then the effect of sequential timing of regions in deciding the strategies jointly. 
The main contributions of our study are as follows. First, we consider the joint and simultaneous 
decision of tax and public investment as opposed to sequential decision for public investment 
and taxation as in Hindriks, Peralta and Weber (2008), Dembour and Wauthy (2009) and Pieretti 
and Zanaj (2011). This helps us in understanding the interaction of tax and public investment 
strategies and their joint impact on attracting mobile capital. Second, we endogenize the 
leadership in joint tax and public investment competition by extending the formulation of Kempf 
and Rota-Graziosi (2010)’s timing game for multiple strategy space. Lastly, but not least, we 
also contribute to the literature on the nature and classification of strategic effects in competitive 
environment, based on the seminal work of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985). We 
analyze the joint effect of tax and public investment which individually are of different strategic 
nature i.e. strategic complements and strategic substitutes respectively. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the joint effect of opposite type of strategic 
choices in a model.  
The main findings from our model are as follows. We show that, under plausible parametric 
conditions, sequential move sub game perfect Nash equilibrium is welfare improving for both the 
regions. Second, we demonstrate that in tax and public investment competition there is a trade 
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off in tax (strategic complements) and public investment (strategic substitutes) effect and there is 
possibility of both first mover and second mover advantage. To formally analyze this, we 
introduce the concepts of joint strategic substitutes (i.e. strategic substitute effect dominates 
strategic complement effect) and joint strategic complements (i.e. strategic complement effect 
dominates strategic substitute effect). We find that if joint strategic substitute effect holds, then 
simultaneous move equilibrium prevails and if joint strategic complements effect holds, then two 
sequential move equilibria hold and are Pareto superior for both the regions compared to the 
simultaneous move equilibrium. Third, given that there is possibility of multiple equilibria, we 
discuss the issue of equilibrium selection using Pareto dominance and risk dominance criteria 
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1986). We are not able to select any of these sequential equilibria based on 
risk or Pareto dominance criteria due to symmetric nature of outcomes.  Further, we show that in 
sequential game equilibrium, welfare as well as tax rates in both the regions are higher compared 
to simultaneous move game. Thus, it restricts the race-to-the-bottom in tax rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the basic framework of the 
model and properties of tax and public investment strategies. Section 3 examines the 
implications of tax and public investment competition in both simultaneous and sequential 
moves by the regions. Section 4 deals with the issue of endogenous leadership in case of tax and 
public investment competition and analyzes the joint strategic effects of multiple strategies. 
Section 5 concludes with policy implications and discussion. 
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2. The Basic Model 
We consider two regions: region-1 and region-2, competing for foreign owned mobile capital. 
Total available mobile capital is assumed to be 1, which is exogenously determined. Both the 
regions strategically decide the level of public investment     and the tax rate     on investment 
capital      in order to maximize their respective welfare. Public investment     facilitates 
production and thus enhances the productivity of investment capital    ; whereas higher tax     
discourages capital inflows. Let          denote the pair of public investment and tax rate to be 
chosen by region    and    denote the investment capital attracted in region    where       . 
Following Hindriks, Peralta and Weber (2008), we consider that the production functions of 
region-1 and region-2 are given by (1) and (2), respectively. 
                        
 
 
  
                                                                     
                       
 
 
  
                                                                      
In equations (1) and (2),        is the technology parameter,        is the rate of decline in 
the marginal productivity of capital and           is the spillover effect of public 
investment in one region on the other region. Here,           corresponds to the case of 
perfect spillover (no spillover). Note that the capital and public investment are complementary in 
the production function. Clearly, the production functions are increasing, twice continuously 
differentiable and concave in the level of capital. The provision of productivity enhancing public 
investment      by both regions, involves cost which is assumed to be a convex quadratic 
function,        
  
 
 
, indicating an increasing marginal cost of provision for public investment. 
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Following Laussel and Le Breton (1998), Hindriks, Peralta and Weber (2008) and Kempf and 
Rota-Graziosi (2010a), the objective functions of region-1 and region-2, in terms of social 
welfare, are as follows: 
             
                     
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
                
  
 
 
                    
              
                      
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
              
  
 
 
                     
Each region is maximizing the sum of return to immobile factors and tax revenue, net of the cost 
of public investment provision. The regions are maximizing only returns on immobile factors 
and tax revenue, since capital is assumed to be foreign owned.
4
 In our model, we assume 
that              
      
 
. They lead to satisfaction of the non negativity constraints on 
outcomes of public investment, tax rates, capital, and welfare level. Also, second order and 
stability conditions of the model are satisfied with these conditions. 
We assume that capital market is perfectly competitive and there is no arbitrage possibility. 
Therefore, capital market clearance condition can be written as follows. 
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 Laussel and Le Breton (1998) argues that such objective functions can also be justified by considering that 
majority of the citizens are consumers (labour) and not investment capital owners. Therefore the regions are 
concerned about the welfare of the representative median voter. As highlighted by one of the reviewers, in case of 
our model, explicit modeling of multidimensional policy space and political set up would be tedious. De Donder et 
al. (2012) discuss the majority voting rules in context of multidimensional policy spaces. 
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Condition (5) states that net marginal returns to capital for both the regions should be equal for 
capital market clearing. Further, marginal return to capital is considered to be positive, leading to 
condition (6) i.e. all the capital is allocated between the regions and no idle capital is available.  
In the next sub-section, we provide the properties of tax rate and public investment in the context 
of fiscal competition between regions. 
2.1 Characterizing fiscal competition between regions 
Before moving on to solve the model, we provide some key characteristics of the strategic 
variables i.e. tax rate and public investment.  
In our fiscal competition model, at the first stage, regions decide their strategic variables in a 
non-cooperative manner, either simultaneously or sequentially. In the second stage, the foreign 
capital owners based on these decisions allocate their capital in either of the regions.  
Note that, irrespective of whether the two regions are engaged in simultaneous or sequential 
competition, stage 2 equilibrium would remain the same. To solve this stage we optimize (5) 
with constraints (1), (2) and (6). The stage 2 equilibrium capital allocation is as follows:  
 
   
                    
  
                                                        
   
                    
  
                                                         
For any given tax rate and level of public investment, amount of mobile capital allocated in 
region-1 and region-2 are given by (7a) and (7b), respectively. Clearly, we can see that,  
   
   
 
  
   
   
         , i.e. higher tax rate in a region leads to lower capital allocation in that region 
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and higher capital allocation in the other region. Also note that if      i.e., if spillover of public 
investment is not perfect,  
   
   
   
   
   
          . It implies that public investment in a region 
positively (negatively) affects level of capital allocated to that region (other region), unless the 
spillover effect of public investment is perfect. Therefore, it is evident that, tax rate and level of 
public investment of a region have opposing effects on the inflow of investment capital in that 
region, as argued before. We can also see that, if tax rate in region-2 (say) decreases, then 
region-1 has an option not to decrease its tax rate and instead spend more on public investment. 
This indicates that the regions have alternate choices in the presence of public investment, other 
than entering into a tax undercutting war leading to a race-to-the-bottom. We discuss this issue in 
subsequent section. 
Now, we consider (a) the properties of tax rates and (b) properties of public investment, in stage 
1. Substituting the expressions for    and    from (7a) and (7b) in (3) and (4), we obtain      
and      . From the first order condition with respect to tax rates, we get the tax reaction 
functions of region-1 and region-2, as follows: 
               
 
 
                                                                           
              
 
 
                                                                            
Based on tax reaction functions, we characterize some properties of tax rates. 
Lemma 1 (Complements) -Tax rates are complements in nature: Welfare of region-1 is 
increasing in    and welfare of region-2 is increasing in   . 
Proof: See appendix A1. 
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This means that if region-1 (say) increases tax rate, region-2’s welfare increases due to higher 
capital flow to region-2. 
Lemma 2 (Strategic complements): Tax rates are strategic complements and reaction 
functions of the regions are positively sloped.  
Proof: See appendix A2. 
Therefore, interregional fiscal competition in terms of tax rates is à la Bertrand in nature. A 
decrease in tax rate in region-1 induces the region-2 to set lower tax rate and vice versa. Also, 
note that lower tax rate in one region, compared to that of its rival region, leads to higher capital 
flow in that region and that, in turn, leads to higher welfare of that region, ceteris paribus. It 
implies that, in case of tax competition, there is a possibility of race-to-the-bottom in tax rates.  
Given the strategic complements nature of tax rates, we can show that in a sequential move tax 
competition game, regions will have second mover advantage (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 
2010a). 
Proposition 1 (Second mover advantage):  Under lemma 1 and Lemma 2, region-1 as well as 
region-2 always prefers to be the follower, rather than a leader, in case of sequential move tax 
competition.  
Proof: See appendix A3. 
Proposition 1 implies that both the regions have unilateral incentive to become follower in a tax 
competition game.  
Next, we consider the properties of public investment in a fiscal competition game. Let us first 
consider that, given the tax rates, the two regions decide their levels of public investments 
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simultaneously and independently. As before, substituting the expressions for    and    from 
(7a) and (7b) in (3) and (4), we obtain       and     . Differentiating the welfare functions 
      and       with respect to public investment level            respectively, we get the 
resultant public investment reaction functions of region-1 and region-2, respectively, as follows.  
             
                      
         
                                                                   
              
                      
         
                                                                   
 
Figure 1: Public investment reaction functions 
 
It is easy to check that the reactions functions are negatively sloped and nature of competition is 
à la Cournot. We depict the public investment reaction functions of the two regions in Figure 1. 
Note that the    parameter affects the intercept as well as slope term in the reaction function and 
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causes outward shifts of the reaction functions. Higher   leads to outward shift of the reaction 
functions and higher spending on public investment and lower welfare. If    increases, the 
reaction functions rotates inwards, as in figure 1. 
Now, we show some important characteristics of public investment in the given framework, 
which are useful for further analysis. 
Lemma 3 (Substitutes):  Levels of public investment are substitutes. Welfare of region-
1,  , is decreasing in    and welfare of region-2,  , is decreasing in   . 
Proof: See appendix A4. 
Lemma 4 (Strategic Substitutes): Levels of public investments are strategic substitutes and the 
corresponding reaction functions of the two regions are downward sloping.  
Proof: See appendix A5. 
Now, we show that if regions engage in public investment competition in a sequential move 
game, then regions prefer to be the leader compared to being the follower.  
Proposition 2 (First mover advantage):  Under Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, both the regions 
always prefer to be the leader rather than a follower in interregional fiscal competition in terms 
of public investments, given the exogenously determined tax rates. 
 Proof: See appendix A6. 
Clearly, we can say that both the regions prefer to be the leader in a public investment 
competition game, because of the strategic substitute nature of the public investment. 
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In the next section, we analyze the combined effect of joint choice of tax and public investment 
in a simultaneous as well as sequential move fiscal competition game.  
 
3. Fiscal Competition: tax and public Investment 
In this section, we analyze multidimensional nature of fiscal competition for mobile capital 
between the regions. Having understood the strategic nature of both tax and public investment, 
the key question we intend to answer is that, when each region has two strategies (tax rate and 
level of public investment) of opposite nature, what would be the outcome of fiscal competition, 
in terms of tax rates, provision of public good as well as regional social welfare. Further, if 
timing is involved in fiscal competition, will a region prefer to be the leader or the follower? 
What would be the Nash equilibrium in the timing game?  To answer these questions, we solve 
the simultaneous as well as sequential game. 
The stages of the multidimensional competition game involved are as follows.  
Stage 1:  Region-1 and region-2 decide the respective tax rates            and amount of 
public investment        . Each region decides its tax rate as well as the level of 
public investment at the same time.  
a) If the regions move simultaneously, then tax rates and levels of public 
investments are decided by both the regions simultaneously and 
independently.  
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b) Alternatively, if regions move sequentially, leader region (say region-1) 
decides its tax rate and level of public investment first, and the follower region 
(say region-2) decides its tax rate and level of public investment next.  
Stage 2:  Mobile capital is allocated between the regions through a perfectly competitive 
capital market, based on their respective tax rates and public investment levels.  
We solve the game using the standard backward induction method, considering (a) simultaneous 
move game and (b) sequential move game, in stage 1, separately.  
3.1 Simultaneous move game 
Note that, in this case also allocation of mobile capital in stage 2 is given by (7a) and (7b) from 
the previous section.  
                
                    
  
                                                        
                
                    
  
                                                         
Now, from (7a), (7b), (3) and (4) we get           and          , respectively. Therefore, 
the problem of the region-1 and the region-2 can be written as follows: 
     
    
      
 
  
               
                               
                                       
   
    
      
 
  
         
                
                                         
                                        
The first order conditions for maximization of the above two objectives are as follows: 
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The values of the capital, tax rates, public investment and welfare for both the regions in 
symmetric sub game perfect Nash equilibrium, are as follows: 
          
 
 
;          
   
 
           
 
 
  and        
 
 
                        (12) 
 
Since the two regions are symmetric, each region gets equal share of mobile capital in 
equilibrium. Tax rates and levels of public investments are also same in the two regions.  
3.2  Sequential move game 
Coming to the case of sequential move game, we intend to complement and extend the analysis 
of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a) who demonstrates that in a sequential move pure tax 
competition for mobile capital, both the regions levy higher tax rates compared to that of 
simultaneous move pure tax competition. They argue that due to change in the timing of the 
moves, regions improve their welfare level and there is restriction in race-to-the-bottom in tax 
rates. Does this result hold in case of multidimensional fiscal competition? We attempt to answer 
this question. 
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The present analysis is particularly interesting because tax rates and levels of public investments 
are of opposite strategic nature. If both the strategies were strategic complements, it would have 
been easy to see that the results of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a) were likely to hold even in 
case of tax and public investment competition. However, it is not straightforward to understand 
the implications, when strategies are of opposite nature.  
Without any loss of generality, we assume that region-1 is leader and region-2 is follower. 
Needless to say that equilibrium outcome of stage 2 remains the same as before. Now, in stage 1, 
we solve the problem of the follower region first, using backward induction method.  
We get the reaction functions of follower (region-2) from first order conditions- (10b) and (11b). 
Now, we solve the problem of leader (region-1). The leader anticipates the strategies of the 
follower region and includes the reaction function of the follower in its problem, then chooses 
for the optimal tax rate and public investment to maximize its regional welfare. 
   
    
               
  
 
   
               
 
          
 
            
 
         
                  
 
                                 
subject to the constraints (10b) and (11b). 
Solving the above problem, we get the equilibrium level of public investment and tax rate of 
leader as follows:  
   
   
                
            
           
  
            
            
     (13a) 
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Substituting the equilibrium values of leader region’s tax rate and public investment in (10b) and 
(11b), we get the optimal level of public investment and the tax rate of the follower region as 
follows: 
   
   
                 
            
          
  
             
            
     (13b) 
The corresponding regional welfare and capital allocation, in equilibrium, are 
   
  
            
             
     
  
                         
              
;    (13c) 
   
  
           
            
          
  
            
            
      (13d) 
 
To satisfy the stability condition, we need     
      
 
,  and for the non negativity constraints we 
must have   
       
 
  and      . Therefore, we assume that   
       
 
 and      .  
In the next section, we use the results of this section from the simultaneous and sequential move 
games, to solve a timing game between the regions to endogenize the choice of leadership.  
 
4. Endogenizing leadership in fiscal competition: a timing game 
Now, we turn to endogenize the regions’ decision to be a leader or a follower in case of 
sequential move multidimensional fiscal competition. First, we analyze whether regions are 
better off in case of sequential move competition than in case of simultaneous move competition 
and address the issue of endogenous leadership, by considering a timing game. Next, we further 
analyze the interplay of the two strategic variables – tax rate and public investment and offer 
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explanation for the equilibrium outcomes of the timing game. In the timing game, in the initial 
stage (say, stage 0), both the regions simultaneously and independently decide whether to be the 
leader (early) or to be the follower (late). That is, in stage 0, each region decides whether to 
move early or late.  
If both the regions decide to move early or they both decide to move late then, the game 
becomes a simultaneous move game in stage 1. Alternatively, if one region opts to move early 
and the other region opts to move late, we have a sequential move game (i.e. Stackelberg game) 
in stage 1. The player who moves early becomes leader and the player moving late is follower. 
Finally, in stage 2, allocation of mobile capital between the two regions is determined through 
competitive capital market as in section 3. Since the decision in stage 0 is about the time of 
move, we refer this extended game as a timing game.  
We solve the above mentioned timing game by standard backward induction method. Note that 
the stage 2 equilibrium outcomes would be same as that in Section 3. In stage 1, (a) the 
equilibrium outcomes are same as given by (12), if both the regions decide to move early or both 
decide to move late in stage 0; (b) the equilibrium outcomes are as given by (13c), if one region 
decides to move early and the other region decides to move late in stage 0. Note that, since 
regions are symmetric, the subscripts 1 and 2 (in 1L and 2F) are interchangeable in (13c). 
Now, we can represent stage 0 of the timing game in normal form as follows.  
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 Region-2 
Early Late 
Region-1 
Early                 
Late                 
Table 1: A timing game 
Comparing the payoffs of the above game corresponding to alternative pairs of strategies, we 
observe that  
(a) if          and        then,                   and  
(b) if       and        then,                ,  
where    
 
 
       and         
 
and         Note that, by assumption,      and 
     . Therefore,     is the critical value of interest. Note that, welfare of any region i (i =1, 
2) can be expressed as    
    
 
 
       
  
 
 
. Therefore,   
    
    
 . That is, we can interpret   as 
the rate of increase in marginal welfare of a region due to change in allocated capital in that 
region. So, higher is the value of  , higher is the increase in welfare (both at level and in 
marginal terms) due to increase in capital flow to a region. In other words, regions value the 
mobile capital more, if   is higher. 
So, if the regions value mobile capital less than a critical level and the spillover effect of public 
investment is less than perfect, i.e., when       and        , the leader gets higher 
payoff (welfare) compared to the simultaneous move game outcome as well as the follower 
region’s payoffs, but the follower gets lesser payoff compared to the simultaneous case. Clearly, 
in this case there is first mover advantage. So both the regions would want to become the leader 
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in sequential game. In such a situation, the game in stage 1 turns out to be simultaneous move 
game, since in stage 0 the equilibrium strategy pair of the two region is (early, early). 
Alternatively, if the regions value mobile capital more than a critical level and the spillover 
effect of public investment is less than perfect, i.e., when                , both the leader 
and follower get higher payoffs compared to the simultaneous move situation. So both the 
regions prefer to have a sequential move game. In this case, the follower’s welfare is higher 
compared to the leader’s welfare. Clearly, there is a second move advantage in this case. So, 
each region wants to become a follower. But, even if one region becomes leader, it attains a 
higher welfare level compared to the simultaneous move game. If one region opts to move early, 
then other region prefers to move late and vice versa. In this situation there are two subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria- (late, early) and (early, late). We summarize these results in the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 3: In the timing game with two choice variables of each region, there are three 
equilibria as follows.  
a) If                   , there is only one subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium,(early , early). 
b) If                , there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria, (late, early) 
and (early, late). These are also Stackelberg equilibria of the game and are Pareto 
improving equilibria for both the regions. 
 
We have shown that, since tax rates are strategic complements, there is second mover advantage 
in pure tax competition (Proposition 1). On the other hand, since levels of public investments are 
22 
 
strategic substitutes, there is first mover advantage in case of pure public investment competition 
(Proposition 2). Now, Proposition 3 implies that, in case of competition in tax rates and levels of 
public investments, if the regions value mobile capital less than a critical level       , regions 
have a first mover advantage and the resultant game is simultaneous move game. In contrast, if 
the regions value mobile capital more than a critical level       , regions have the second 
mover advantage and the resultant game is a sequential move game. Therefore, it is not 
necessary that there will be second mover advantage for at least one region and sequential move 
game need not necessarily be Pareto superior to simultaneous move game, if we allow for larger 
strategy space that includes both tax rate and level of public investment. Clearly, the results of 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a), where pure tax competition has been considered, emerge as a 
special case in the present analysis. In case of multidimensional fiscal competition for mobile 
capital, whether Stackelberg equilibrium will emerge as the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium 
or not, that depends on the rate of change in marginal welfare of the regions due to change in 
capital allocation.  
Note that, we can say that whether a region is a leader (loses in tax rates decision and gains in 
public investment decision) or a follower (loses in public investment decision and gains in tax 
rate decision), it loses in one strategic variable’s decision and gains in the other. It indicates that 
the relative strength of the two strategic effects, strategic substitute effect via public investment 
and strategic complement effect via tax rate, determines the equilibrium of the timing game.  
Therefore, in order to understand the mechanism behind the changes in the equilibrium as the 
magnitude of the parameter   changes, we need to examine the interplay between the strategic 
complement effect of tax rates and strategic substitute effect of levels of public investments. We 
suspect that when strategic substitutes effect dominates strategic complement effect, we get the 
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first equilibrium (early, early) because of first mover advantage; on the other hand, when 
strategic complements effect is stronger than the strategic substitute effect, there is second mover 
advantage and we get two Stackelberg equilibria, (late, early) and (early, late). These results can 
be compared with industrial organization literature (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Robson, 1990). 
In case of endogenous timing price (quantity) competition game between two firms, Stackelberg 
(Cournot) outcome is Pareto superior for both the both firms. But our results differs from them in 
the context of strategy space (we consider two strategic variables, instead of only one strategic 
variable). 
In the next sub-section, we untangle the joint effect of two strategies. We note here that, to the 
best of our knowledge, in the relevant literature, the nature and impact of joint effect of two or 
more number of opposite strategies has not been discussed so far. Therefore, from a theoretical 
point view as well, it is important to formalize the concept of joint effect of multiple strategies, 
which are of opposite nature, and to examine the implication of joint effect of multiple strategies 
on equilibrium outcomes.  
4.1 Joint strategic substitute and joint strategic complement 
Let us first define the ‘Joint strategic substitute’ and ‘Joint strategic complement’ as follows. 
Definition: In case of multidimensional fiscal competition between players, i.e., when players 
can choose more than one variable (of opposite nature) strategically, if strategic substitute effect 
dominates the strategic complements effect, the joint nature of strategic variables is ‘Joint 
Strategic Substitute (JSS)’ and effect being JSS effect (JSSE). On the other hand, if strategic 
complement effect dominates strategic substitute effect, the joint nature of strategic variables is 
‘Joint Strategic Complement (JSC)’ and effect being JSC effect (JSCE). 
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Now, in the multidimensional competition game, there are two choices where regions either 
prefer to become leader or follower. Clearly, the joint effect of the two strategic variables, tax 
rate and level of public investment, is the difference between the leader and the follower region’s 
payoffs in the sequential move game. We can express the joint effect (JE) of the two strategic 
variables on region i’s (i = 1, 2) welfare as follows.  
                                                                                                
Without any loss of generality, let us consider that i =1 and j =2. Now using the welfare function 
of region-1, we can decompose the     as follows.  
                                                            
                                                       –                                                   
                    
Here, in the first part strategy differs in terms of public investment (strategic substitute) and in 
the second part, it is the tax rates that differ (strategic complement). 
Clearly,      , if           and a region prefers to be the leader due to first mover 
advantage of public investment being larger that second mover advantage of tax rate.  
Now, plugging the values of welfare we get the following. 
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It is easy to check that, 
(a)       , if           
    
(b)      , if      =      
 .  
(c)                    
 .  
Therefore, if     , SSE dominates SCE, i.e., there is JSSE, and the regions prefer to be the 
leader. In contrast, if     , SCE dominates SSE, i.e., there is JSCE, and regions prefer to be 
follower. Note that, this is true for region-2 as well.  
 
Proposition 4: In the multidimensional fiscal competition game: 
a) Both the regions would have first mover advantage if there is joint strategic substitute 
effect i.e. SSE >SCE and Nash equilibrium in the timing game would be {early, early}; 
b) On the other hand regions would have second mover advantage and there would be joint 
strategic complement effect i.e. SCE > SSE and Nash equilibrium would be either {early, 
late} or {late, early}, a la Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a).  
In appendix A7 of this paper, we also provide an alternative explanation of joint strategic 
substitute and complement effect using the reaction functions of region’s strategies (tax and 
public investment).  
As is clear, the critical value of   plays a crucial role in determining whether simultaneous or 
sequential move equilibria would prevail.  One plausible explanation for this result is as follows. 
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The value of   affects the strategic nature of tax rates and public investment through their 
reaction functions. In case of tax rates, a higher value of    leads to higher intercept of tax 
reaction function which in turn leads to higher equilibrium tax rates, keeping other things 
constant. For the public investment, on the other side, there is effect both on intercept and slope. 
Higher   leads to regions being more aggressive with over investment as the outcome, keeping 
other things constant. Keeping these two effects in mind, in the joint choice of tax and public 
investment, at the lower values of         , the strategic substitute effect of public investment 
remain larger, as compared to strategic complements effect of tax rates and therefore, first mover 
advantage holds. This leads to {early, early} as the Nash equilibrium of the timing game. On the 
other hand, for larger values of       , the effect on tax reaction function is larger as compared 
to public investment reaction functions, thus leading to second mover advantage due to joint 
strategic effect tilting towards strategic complements . 
In the next sub-section, we attempt to resolve the choice of one of the equilibrium in case of 
multiple equilibria of the timing game.  
 
4.2 Equilibrium Selection: Pareto vs. Risk Dominance 
As noted earlier, there are multiple equilibria of the timing game, when JSCE holds, (Proposition 
3, Part (b)). Now the question arises, how do we select one of the two equilibria? In the literature 
on selection of equilibrium, there are two criteria which are widely used to rank them. One is 
Pareto dominance criterion and another one is risk dominance criterion. Pareto dominance 
criterion is applicable when at least one player is better off without worsening the others. On the 
other hand, an equilibrium risk-dominates the other when former is less risky than the latter, that 
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is risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which product of deviation losses is the largest 
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). 
In our case, from Proposition 3 part (b), equilibrium (early, late) (region-1 leads and region-2 
follows) risk dominates equilibrium (late, early) (region-2 leads and region-1 follows), if the 
former is associated with larger product of deviation losses:                      
                    . That is, the equilibrium (early, late) risk dominates (late, early), 
if the product of welfare losses of the two regions by deviating from (early, late) is greater than 
the product of welfare losses of the two regions by deviating from (late, early), to the (early, 
early) or (late, late).  
Now, since the regions are assumed to be symmetric,                 and        .  
Therefore, in the present context, we have   =0.  It implies that none of the two equilibrium risk 
dominates the other. Therefore, we cannot select any one of the two equilibria by the risk 
dominance criterion. Also, it is straightforward to observe that we cannot select any equilibrium 
on the basis of the Pareto dominance criterion either.  
 
4.3 Equilibrium outcomes: tax and public investment level 
In this subsection, we discuss the level of tax rates and public investment in both regions under 
alternative scenarios i.e. simultaneous move equilibrium {early, early} and {early, late} or {late, 
early}.  
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Table 2: Ranking of equilibrium outcomes 
            
            
  
Joint Effect             , if                       , if            
Nash equilibrium {early, early} {early, late} or {late, early} 
Welfare                                 
Capital                                 
Public Investment                                 
Taxes                                 
 
As can be seen from the table 2, in case of {early, early} equilibrium, there is symmetry in the 
outcomes. Interestingly, tax rates are higher than the case of Stackelberg outcome (leader and 
follower regions) and thus indicate restrictions in race-to-the-bottom. On the other hand, in case 
of sequential move equilibrium, tax rates of both the regions are higher than simultaneous game. 
This indicates that irrespective of the strategy space, sequential move of regions leads to 
restriction in the race-to-the-bottom (similar to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010a). Further, leader 
region’s public investment level is lower than the follower region but the reverse order holds for 
tax rates. In terms of capital mobility, follower region wins over the leader region, with impact of 
higher public investment overcoming the negative impact of higher tax rates in that region. For 
further details on the results, please refer to appendix A8 of the paper. 
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
We demonstrate the nature of Nash equilibrium in a multidimensional fiscal competition for 
foreign owned mobile capital if the strategic choices (tax and public investment) are of opposite 
nature. We first show that in a pure tax competition game, tax rates are strategic complements 
and each of the two regions prefers to be follower, because of second mover advantage. In 
contrast, public investments are strategic substitutes and the regions prefer to be leader in 
sequential move game. 
In a fiscal competition with both tax rate and public investment, we examine the consequences of 
interplay between these two choice variables. We demonstrate that, since tax rate and level of 
public investment are of opposite strategic nature, there is a trade off involved. As a result, the 
possibility of both first mover advantage and second mover advantage exists, unlike in case of 
uni-dimensional competition. This is a new result.   
Next, we formalize the concepts of joint strategic substitute effect and joint strategic 
complements effect. We show that if there is a joint strategic substitute effect, both the regions 
prefers to be the leader and, thus, the resultant outcome is simultaneous move Nash equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if there is a joint strategic complement effect, sequential move equilibrium is 
Pareto superior than the simultaneous move equilibrium. However, in the latter case there are 
two sequential move equilibria, which are identical from the point of view of both Pareto 
dominance and risk dominance criterion.  
We also provide ranking of the equilibrium outcomes in alternative scenarios.  We show that, if 
there is joint strategic complements effect, capital allocated and level of public investment in the 
follower (leader) region is higher than that in case of simultaneous move equilibrium. But, the 
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equilibrium tax rate (welfare) of leader region is higher (lower) than that of the follower region, 
and equilibrium tax rate and welfare of both leader region and follower region are higher (lower) 
than that in case of simultaneous move game. These results are similar to that in Kempf and 
Rota-Graziosi (2010a). In sequential move game, race-to-the-bottom is controlled and further, 
there is also limited restriction on the overspending on public investment. 
For further research some of the extension of this study can be on the following lines. First, 
whether results of the model is likely to remain robust to increasing the numbers regions 
competing with each other. For the sake of brevity, we just provide our intuition for the same. In 
our model, increasing the number of regions, would have two effects from tax and public 
investment strategies side. On the one hand, large number of regions would intensify the 
competition in tax rates leading to race-to-the-bottom. On the other hand, in public investment 
competition, due to spillover effects and strategic substitute nature of public investment, there 
would be reduction in public investment level of the regions. These two effects when combined 
would reduce the welfare level of each region in the simultaneous move equilibrium. Now the 
intuition in a dynamic setting would be slightly tedious to provide. The reason being as follows. 
In N regions sequential game, one region would be the leader where as N-1 regions would be the 
follower. Now there would be two sets of effects generated. One, we have already discussed in 
the earlier case i.e. follower regions would compete with each other in a simultaneous choice 
game, but leader would have to pre-empt and act according to the competition among the 
followers as well as based on the strategic effect of followers on his/her strategic choice of tax 
rates and public investment. A detailed analysis would help, in answering whether sequential 
effect (leading to higher tax rate) would dominate the simultaneous effect (leading to lower tax 
rates) or not. Further, a similar argument holds for public investment level also. 
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Second extension could be in terms of departure from absentee capital owners to resident owners 
of capital and their impact on outcomes of the model. Ogawa (2013) analyzed the extension of 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a) to the case of heterogeneous capital ownership (from absentee 
ownership to resident ownership), the author finds that in the case of resident ownership, instead 
of equilibrium corresponding to Stackelberg outcome, simultaneous move outcome emerges as 
sub game perfect Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if there is absentee ownership then 
Stackelberg outcome would emerge. Later on Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2015) argued that based 
on the strategic nature of tax rates, there can be emergence of both simultaneous and sequential 
outcomes with various capital ownership structure. Keeping this in mind, in our context, we can 
argue that resident ownership of capital is more likely to tilt results towards simultaneous 
outcomes as compared to sequential outcome. A detailed analysis would surely help in 
understanding this scenario better and is left for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1:  Tax rates are complements in nature.  
Proof: We have,     
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
         and      
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
        . 
Differentiating           with respect to            respectively, we get 
   
   
         
   
   
                                                                                  
   
   
         
   
   
                                                                                
Now, from equation (7a) and (7b), we get 
   
   
 
   
   
 
 
  
  . Substituting theses values in 
(A1.a) and (A1.b), we have, 
   
   
 
 
  
           and 
   
   
 
 
  
           . QED. 
 
A2: (Strategic complements) 
Proof: It is easy to check that 
    
      
 
 
 
   
   
   and 
    
      
 
 
 
   
   
      That is, if there is an 
increase in region-2’s (region-1’s) tax rate, the negative marginal effect of region-1’s (region-
2’s) tax rate on its own welfare decreases. Therefore, tax rates are strategic complements.  From 
(10a) and (10b), we get the slopes of the tax reaction functions of region-1 and region-2, 
respectively, as follows, 
   
   
        and 
   
   
    
 
 
  . QED.  
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A3: (Second mover advantage)   
Proof:  Since the two regions are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that region-1 always prefers 
to be the follower in sequential move tax competition. That is, we have to prove that 
  (         ) >             , where (a)      and      are the equilibrium tax rates of region-1 
and region-2, respectively, when region-1 is the follower and region-2 is the leader and (b)     
and      are the equilibrium tax rates of region-1 and region-2, respectively, when region-1 is the 
leader and region-2 is the follower. The proof is as follows (follows from Kempf and Rota-
Graziosi, 2010a): 
In case of Stackelberg (sequential) competition in tax rates, we have  1N < 1F < 1L. (see Kempf 
and Rota-Graziosi, 2010a for a detailed discussion) and same holds from region-2’s perspective.  
Now we can say that 
 1( 1F,  2L ) > 1( 1L,  2L) > 1( 1L,  2F )  
In this, first inequality comes from the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium when region-1 is the 
follower.  The second part of the inequality holds given the fact that  2F <  2L and  
      
   
   
(due to complement nature of tax rates from Lemma 1). Thus the region-1 has a second mover 
advantage in tax rates. Due to the symmetry in the payoff of region-2, the second mover 
advantage also holds for region-2 also. QED. 
 
A4: (Public investments are Substitutes) 
Proof: We have               
           
  
 
 
         and               
          
 
  
 
 
           Using the production function (1) and (2), we can write the following. 
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Now differentiating        with respect to            respectively, we get,  
   
   
         
   
   
                                                     
   
   
         
   
   
                                                      
Differentiating (7a) and (7b) w.r.t.           , respectively, we get 
   
   
 
   
   
 
      
  
    
Substituting theses values in above equations, we get, 
   
   
 
      
  
            and  
   
   
 
      
  
           . QED 
 
A5: (Strategic Substitutes)  
Proof: It is easy to check that 
    
      
 
   
   
   
   
   and 
    
      
 
   
   
   
   
  . Therefore, levels 
of public investments are strategic substitutes. Now, using the public investment reaction 
functions of region-1 and region-2 from (9a) and (9b), we obtain, 
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We must have,           to satisfy the second order, stability and non negativity conditions. 
So, we can say that reaction curves in public investment choice are downward sloping. QED. 
 
A6: Proposition 2 (First mover advantage) 
 Proof: Under Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we can show that both the regions prefer to be the leader.  
In case of Stackelberg game for public investment,  1F <  1N <  1L and the same holds for the 
region-2’s public investment level under different conditions. With that in mind, we can say that: 
 1( 1L,  2F) > 1( 1F,  2F) > 1( 1F,  2L) 
In this, first inequality comes from the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium when region-1 is the 
leader.  The second part of the inequality holds given the fact that  2F <  2L and  
      
   
   (due 
to substitute nature of public investment from Lemma 3). Thus the region-1 has a first mover 
advantage in public investment. Due to the symmetry in the payoff of region-2, the first mover 
advantage also holds for region-2 also. QED 
 
A7: Alternate explanation of joint effects and its decomposition  
To illustrate it further, note that tax reaction functions are strictly upward sloping and public 
investment reaction functions are strictly downward sloping (see Lemma 2 and Lemma 4). The 
slopes of tax reaction function in t1-t2 plane and the slope of the public investment reaction 
function in g1-g2 plane, of region-2 are, respectively,    
   
   
      and  
   
   
  
         
      
 . And, 
the slopes of tax reaction function in t1-t2 plane and the slope of the public investment reaction 
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function in g1-g2 plane, of region-2 are, respectively, 
   
   
 
 
 
      and   
   
   
  
      
         
  . Note 
that, in t1-t2 plane, flatter (steeper) the tax reaction function of region-1 (region-2), greater is the 
response of region-1 (region-2) for a unit change in its rival’s tax rate. Similarly, in g1-g2 plane, 
flatter (steeper) the public investment reaction function of region-1 (region-2), greater is the 
response of region-1 (region-2) for a unit change in its rival’s public investment.  
In general, we can write the slope of the tax reaction functions of region-2, in t1-t2 plane, as  
   
   
   
    
      
    
   
 
  
On the RHS, the denominator must be negative (due to the second order condition) and the 
numerator is the strategic complement effect of tax rates, which is positive.  
Similarly, we can write the slope of the public investment reaction function of region-2, in g1-g2 
plane, as  
   
   
   
    
      
    
   
 
 . Here, In the RHS, the denominator must be negative (by the second 
order condition for maximization) and the numerator is the strategic substitute effect of tax rates, 
which is negative.  
Now, we argue that the relative magnitude of strategic effect of a choice variable, relative to that 
of the other choice variable, can be shown to be related to the relative magnitudes of the reaction 
functions.  
Proposition 4: In the sequential move multidimensional competition, the relation between the 
joint strategic effects and slopes of the reactions functions are as follows.  
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a) Joint Strategic Substitutes Effect (JSSE) holds, if the absolute slope of the public 
investment reaction function of region-2 (region-1) in g1-g2 plane is greater (smaller) 
than the absolute slope of the tax reaction function of region-2 (region1) in t1-t2 plane.  
b) Joint Strategic Complements Effect (JSCE) holds, if the absolute slope of the public 
investment reaction function of region-2 (region-1) in g1-g2 plane is smaller (greater) 
than the absolute slope of the tax reaction function of region-2 (region-1) in t1-t2 plane.  
Proof:  It is sufficient to show that the Proposition 4 is true for any one of the two regions due to 
symmetric nature. Let us consider region-2’s reaction functions. Now, the absolute value of slope 
of the public investment reaction function of region-2, in g1-g2 plane, is  greater than the absolute 
value of the slope of the tax reaction function of region-2, in t1-t2 plane, if  
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That is, if for region-2  
   
   
   
   
   
 , there is JSSE. Otherwise, if  
   
   
   
   
   
 , there is JSCE.  
QED  
 
Note that, if all the choice variables are strategic complements in nature, JSCE will always hold 
true. In Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a), each region has one choice variable (tax rate) and tax 
rates are strategic complements, so there is JSCE and, thus, each region has second mover 
advantage. However, in general, JSCE effect need not necessarily hold true. In the present 
model, JSCE holds true, only if the absolute slope of the public investment reaction function of 
region-2 (region-1) in g1-g2 plane is smaller (greater) than the absolute slope of the tax reaction 
function of region-2 (region-1) in t1-t2 plane. Otherwise, JSSE holds true.   
 
A8: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes between simultaneous and sequential game: tax 
rate, public investment, capital allocation and social welfare 
In Table 2, we report the rankings welfare, capital allocation, level of public investment and tax 
rate of region-1 and region-2, in (early, late), (late, early) and simultaneous move equilibrium, 
assuming         
 
 
           .  
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Welfare                                 
Capital                                 
Pub. Investment                                 
Taxes                                 
Table 2: Ranking of equilibrium outcomes 
 
Case 1:       
In this case, tax rates (strategic complement) effect is less than public investments (strategic 
substitute) effect and, thus, joint strategic substitute effect holds true. So, there is first mover 
advantage. If region-1 moves early and region-2 moves late, public investment in region-1 is 
higher than that in region-2. The reason being that region-1 is more aggressive in setting public 
investment due to JSSE. But, both leader and follower region’s tax rates are lower as compared 
to the simultaneous move game. The reason is that, in region-1, the capital elasticity of tax rates 
in the sequential game is higher than simultaneous move game (           
      
  
               
 
 
 
 . For region-2 which has the same level of capital elasticity of tax in both the games 
(                       
 
 
), the level of public investment is lower than the earlier game, so 
region-2 being a follower charges tax rate even lower than region-1. Moreover region-2 is the 
follower in tax rates which causes lower tax rate as compared to region-1. In total, the strategic 
effect of tax rates (SCE) is dominated by strategic effect of public investment (SSE).  So, the 
higher public investment in region-1 over compensates the negative effect of tax rate. This 
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causes higher allocation of capital in region-1 and lower in region-2, compared to the 
simultaneous move game.  These are new results.    
Case 2:      
In this case, we have a Pareto superior situation in the sequential move game, because both the 
regions are getting higher payoffs compared to their simultaneous game payoffs, irrespective of 
the role of the region as a leader or a follower. For this case, we have joint strategic complements 
effect and regions prefer to become the follower. As we can see that region-2 is providing higher 
level of public investment than region-1. There are higher tax rates because, regions’ tax reaction 
functions shifts outwards due higher  . So region-1 as well as region-2 charges higher tax rates 
than the simultaneous move game. Moreover, region-2 is levying lower tax rate than region-1, 
due to higher sensitivity of capital to tax rates in region-2. This leads to a higher capital 
allocation to region-2 (
    
    
   
    
    
  ) as well as higher welfare levels in region-2. These 
results are similar to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010a), in the sense that sequential game 
equilibrium is providing higher welfare level for both the regions, irrespective of the role as a 
leader or a follower.  
 
A9. Discussion on empirical estimation of fiscal competition 
To further extend the scope of this study, an empirical investigation of strategic choice of regions 
in fiscal competition can be undertaken. To empirically estimate the strategic tax competition 
models, one need to essentially model and estimate the reaction functions of the regions 
corresponding to tax, public investment or joint choice games either in static (simultaneous) or 
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dynamic (sequential) setting
5
. To test the hypothesis of our model and check whether key 
parameter threshold of   in our model, we can focus on equations, 7 (a & b), 10 (a & b) and 11 (a 
& b). Say from equation 7 (a &b), we can say that the relation between the own tax rates and 
capital level in a region is negative, keeping other things constant and further the corresponding 
coefficient estimated would be 
  
  
 
  
  
  On the other hand for public investment and capital 
level, the coefficient would depend on regional spillover   and change in marginal productivity 
of capital  . Further, in estimating the strategic interaction of tax rates and public investment, 
value of   is estimated through intercept terms and both intercept and coefficient terms 
respectively. While estimating the empirical model, a few caveats should be kept in mind, in our 
model we assume symmetry of regions to focus on the strategic interaction more, which may not 
be true in empirical settings. Further, it may so happen in that in empirical setting, there are both 
simultaneous and sequential competition outcomes are visible between various pairs of 
regions/countries and therefore, a more general model need to be structured taking motivation 
from the existing model. This remains beyond the scope of this paper, but can be analyzed in 
future research.  
 
                                                     
5
 For a detailed discussion on estimation and methodological issues, one can refer to Altshuler and Goodspeed 
(2015). 
